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Abstract
We investigate the e¤ects of Chapter 11 bankruptcy lings on product market
competition using data from the US airline industry. We 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1 Introduction
In the past few years thousands of rms have led for bankruptcy protection under
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Law.1 Firms ling for bankruptcy
protection belong to a wide range of industries, from Lehman Brothers to Chrysler
and GM.2 The unprecedented number of lings has led to a renewed interest in the
economics of bankruptcy. Most of the previous work has examined the direct costs
of bankruptcy proceedings, such as legal and administrative expenses, as well as their
indirect costs, such as lost sales (Franks and Torous (1989), Thorburn (2000), Bris,
Welch, and Zhu (2006), Hennesy and Whited (2007), Bebchuk (2002)).3 There is
also work on the e¤ects of bankruptcy on rm survival (Hotchkiss (1995)), on equity
returns (Jorion and Zhang (2008)), and on innovation (Acharya and Subramanian
(2009)). Nonetheless, there is surprisingly little work on the e¤ects of bankruptcy
lings on product market competition.
This paper uses data from the US airline industry to investigate the e¤ect of
Chapter 11 lings on prices, capacity choices, and networks. These data are from
one single industry for which we have data from a cross-section of local markets.
This allows an examination of how bankruptcy lings a¤ect the strategic decisions
of rms, holding industry xed. In this sense, our approach is in the same spirit
as Chevalier (1995), who uncovers basic stylized patterns in the relationship between
leverage buyouts and the pricing behavior of rms and their rivals using cross-section
data from the US supermarket industry.
The airline industry provides an interesting empirical framework for several ad-
ditional reasons. First, air transport is arguably the most important means of
transportation in the US Second, the airlines seeking bankruptcy protection form a
heterogeneous group, including low cost carriers such as ATA, and national carriers
such as United and USAir. The range of variation in the identities of the bankrupt
1There has also been an outstanding number of personal bankruptcy lings. See White [2007] for
more on this.
2Lehman Brothers led in July 2008. Chrysler and GM led in April and June 2009; respectively.
3See also the early work by White [1982]. Recently, there has been extended research comparing
auctions against a reorganization-based bankruptcy system such as Chapter 11. See Hotchkiss and
Mooradian (2003) and Eckbo and Thorburn (2009).
airlines ensures that our empirical analysis provides insights on other industries as
well. Third, because it is one industry where carriers interact over many distinct
markets and over time, we can identify the e¤ects of bankruptcy on product market
competition, independent of potentially confounding market, rm, and time e¤ects.
Finally, because there are bankrupt and non-bankrupt carriers serving the same mar-
ket, we can investigate di¤erent carriersprice reactions to one carriers bankruptcy.
We start our analysis by looking at how bankruptcy lings a¤ect the network of
the bankrupt carrier and of its rivals. We nd that at the US national level, the
bankrupt carrier permanently drops approximately 25 percent of its pre-bankruptcy
routes. We also look at airport specic networks. Not surprisingly, we nd similar
results. The bankrupt carrier reduces its average number of markets out of an airport
by 26 percent while under bankruptcy protection, and by 24 after its emergence from
Chapter 11 relative to its pre-bankruptcy numbers. Its rivals increase the average
number of markets they serve at the US national level, but this result is not very
robust across specications and we do not conrm it when we look at changes in the
number of markets out of airports. Next, we investigate how bankruptcy lings a¤ect
the ight frequency and capacity decisions. We nd that the bankrupt rm lowers by
21 percent the average frequency of ights within a route while operating under court
protection, and by 32:8 percent once the carrier emerges from bankruptcy. We also
nd that bankruptcy lings have an equally signicant e¤ect on the bankrupts aver-
age capacity (measured by seats in a route) both during and following a bankruptcy
ling. We do not nd robust evidence of any signicant changes by the bankrupt
airlines competitors along any of the dimensions above. We conclude our analysis
with a study of the e¤ects of bankruptcy lings on airline market mean prices. We
nd that the insolvent carriers price drops by 3:1 percent while under bankruptcy
protection, and increase by almost 5 percent after emerging, both of these numbers
relative to pre-bankruptcy prices. Again, we do not nd evidence of any signicant
changes by the bankrupt airlines competitors along any of the dimensions above.
This article contributes to the sparse empirical literature on product-market com-
petition and bankruptcy. Borenstein and Rose (1995, 2003) also study the relation-
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ship between bankruptcy lings and product-market competition.4 In looking at
the e¤ect on prices and on frequency, they nd that in the quarter during which a
carrier les for Chapter 11 protection, the number of ights at the airports where the
bankrupt carrier operates declines by about 20 percent relative to the pre-bankruptcy
level. Borenstein and Rose (1995) do not nd any systematic evidence that either
bankrupt rms or their competitors changed prices after a bankrupt rms Chapter
11 ling. Mainly, our analysis di¤ers from theirs along four dimensions. First, we
look at multiple strategic decisions (airport and national network structure, capacity
choices, prices). Thus, we can provide a unied framework to understand the e¤ect of
bankruptcy lings. Instead, Borenstein and Rose (1995, 2003) limited their analysis
just to changes in prices and in number of markets out of airports. We show that
the most important changes concern capacity choices in the markets that airlines
continue to serve and the size of the network served by the bankrupt airline after
exiting from bankruptcy. Second, we investigate the e¤ects during and after a com-
petitors bankruptcy ling. The post-emergence analysis adds to our understanding
of what the permanentchanges are in the set of services o¤ered following a rms
bankruptcy ling. This conforms to the notion that the main purpose of bankruptcy
lings should be to allow rms time to reorganize themselves and that the evaluation
of the economic success of a bankruptcy ling should be made after the rms exit
from bankruptcy. Third, we show that the e¤ects are fundamentally di¤erent for the
bankrupt rms and their rivals. In contrast, Borenstein and Rose (1995, 2003) esti-
mate the average e¤ect across both ling and non-ling carriers, and therefore they
do not identify the e¤ect on the ling carrier separately from that on its competitors.
This is important because bankruptcies do not only a¤ect the bankrupt rm but also
its competitors. It is quite emblematic that all the legacy carriers in the United States
have now led at least once for Chapter 11. Fourth, we include specications that
4 In addition to the di¤erences discussed in the body of the article, our analysis di¤ers from theirs
along two other dimensions. First, it is likely that there are heterogeneous route-carrier unobservables
that might confound the results in Borenstein and Rose (2003). We control for this using route-
carrier xed e¤ects. Second, bankruptcy categorical variables might proxy for the changes in the
services that the (bankrupt and non-bankrupt) rms provided even when no carrier was operating
under bankruptcy protection. We include carrier specic dummies in order to avoid confounding the
bankruptcy e¤ects with the carrier-specic e¤ects.
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control for such unobserved heterogeneity using route-carrier xed e¤ects, since it is
likely that there are heterogeneous route-carrier unobservables that might confound
the results in Borenstein and Rose (1995, 2003). Including route-carrier xed e¤ects
rather than just carrier xed e¤ects and route xed e¤ects has been shown to be of
fundamental importance in empirical studies of the airline industry.5
This work is also related to a growing theoretical literature that examines whether
a rms capital structure impacts competition in the market for the rms products.
This literature focuses on how nancial distress impacts the competitive interaction
of distressed and non-distressed rms in an industry (Brander and Lewis (1986),
Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Hendel (1996), Dasgupta and Titman (1998)). Sev-
eral empirical papers followed providing evidence of the interaction between nancial
distress and product market competition (Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Chevalier
and Scharfstein (1995, 1996), Chevalier (1995a, 1995b), Phillips (1995), Campello
(2006), Bhagat, Moyen, and Suh (2005), Kovenock and Phillips (1995)), and between
bankruptcy lings and stock market performance (Ferris, Jayaraman, and Makhija
(1997)). Within this literature, the closest paper to ours is Chevalier (1995a). Our
paper di¤ers from hers along one important dimension: we have data on the individ-
ual price of the rms, while Chevalier only has data on the average price in a market.
This additional information is of crucial importance in our empirical analysis since
we do not nd evidence of almost any reaction by the rivals of rm that les for
Chapter 11 protection.
2 Bankruptcies in the Airline Industry
Several factors that can alter the competitive interaction between rms in an indus-
try come into play when one of the rms reorganizes under Chapter 11.6 First, the
5Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) analyzed the e¤ects of competition on price dispersion in the airline
industry, using panel data from 1993:Q1 through 2006:Q3 and showed that their results contrasted
with those of Borenstein and Rose (1994), who found that price dispersion increased with competition.
Gerardi and Shapiro presented evidence that the di¤erent results in Borenstein and Rose (1994) and
Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) were reconciled by showing that not including route xed e¤ects would
not be enough to control from omitted-variable bias.
6The United States Bankruptcy Code contemplates two alternative solutions for rms in nancial
distress ling for court protection: Chapter 7 and Chapter 11.
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bankrupt rm faces cost shocks inherent to operating under court protection, such as
the ability to renege and renegotiate contracts. Furthermore, the bankrupt rm faces
demand shocks that can result in reduced demand for its products, as in Opler and
Titman (1994). Finally, reorganization might entail changes in the rms product
quality (see Maksimovic and Titman (1991)), inventory (Hendel (1996)), and capac-
ity. These also have the potential to disrupt the competitive interaction of rms in
the industry. To capture all of these changes we use bankruptcy categorical variables.
2.1 Stylized Facts of Airline Bankruptcies
Table 1 summarizes some stylized facts.7 Consistent with Bris et al. (2006) and Chen
and Schoar (2007), this table reveals signicant heterogeneity among bankruptcies.
This is most evident in the range of time that the rm spends under bankruptcy (from
18 days for Air South to 1; 513 days for United Airlines), the way in which the rm
resolves its bankruptcy (emerging or having to convert to Chapter 7 liquidation); and
the specic way in which the emerging rm exits bankruptcy (on its own, or merging
with another carrier). Columns 3 and 4 show that almost all airlines rst le for
Chapter 11 protection. Large airlines soon begin to develop a reorganization plan.
Smaller carriers rst attempt to keep the business alive by seeking an investor that
Chapter 7, entitled Liquidation, allows for an orderly, court-supervised procedure by which a
trustee collects the assets of the rm, reduces them to cash, and makes distributions to creditors
subject to the debtors right to retain certain exempt property and to the rights of secured creditors.
Chapter 11, entitled Reorganization, allows the bankrupt rm to continue operating while the rms
management restructures the rms business. Firms that le for Chapter 11 are those deemed a viable
ongoing concern which can potentially repay creditors through a court-approved reorganization plan.
We focus on Chapter 11 lings and drop rms ling under Chapter 7 because we are interested in the
competitive and strategic e¤ect triggered by a rm in the market that operates under bankruptcy
protection, and rms ling for Chapter 7 stop operations and liquidate their assets.
7Airlines that have led for bankruptcy in the last two decades are identied using the Air
Transportation Association (ATA) website. This website provides a list of the names of air carriers
that have led for protection, the date of the bankruptcy ling, and the type of protection that
the airline requested (reorganization under Chapter 11 or liquidation under Chapter 7). We cross
check this data with the Bankruptcy Research Database compiled by Professor Lynn LoPucki. For
each of the airlines ling for Chapter 11 between 1992 and 2007, we manually search Factiva and
Lexis-Nexus for news report dating to about one year prior to and two years after the rms ling.
This allows us to include items such as whether the ling was voluntary or not, whether the airline
originally led for Chapter 11 but was forced to convert its ling to Chapter 7, whether the carrier
emerged from bankruptcy or not, the date and the way in which the carrier exited bankruptcy, if
the carrier was grounded and if so the date when it stopped ying, and if grounding was voluntary
or a safety requirement imposed by the FAA.
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would buy the carriers ying certicate and any other assets the carrier might still
posses. If the carriers management is unsuccessful at nding such investor(s), the
carrier converts its Chapter 11 ling into a Chapter 7 ling. For instance, in the case
of MarkAirs second ling the U.S. Bankruptcy court changed the carriers Chapter
11 ling to Chapter 7, after the carrier spent 8 months under Chapter 11. Column
5 shows that in only two cases, Sun Country and Eastwind, the ling was a Chapter
7 Liquidation initiated by the carriers creditors who took the rm to court.8 Some
airlines le for Chapter 11 protection multiple times (Column 6). The probability
that it emerges as an independent entity declines with the number of past lings
and with shorter time spans between lings (Columns 7 to 11). For example, USAir
emerged from its second Chapter 11 ling after merging with America West, and
TWA emerged from its third ling after being acquired by American. We expect
the competitive behavior to change di¤erently when carriers le for the rst time,
or for subsequent times and, indeed, this is what we nd in our empirical analysis.
Column 12 shows substantial heterogeneity in the time that a rm can operate under
Chapter 11 protection. There is no clear relationship between the duration and the
probability of emergence from bankruptcy.
2.2 The Economics of Airline Industry Bankruptcy Filings
The reorganization of the rms operating plan during bankruptcy can result in
changes in the markets served, as well as in the way these markets are served. For
example, after ling for bankruptcy protection on September 14, 2005, Delta Air-
lines implemented several major changes. One of the most important ones was its
decision to abandon the Dallas/Fort Worth airport as one of its hubs. This led to
fewer non-stop destinations out of Dallas, and fewer ights on the routes that were
still served. During reorganization, the insolvent rm might downsize operations in
markets burdened with excess capacity and in the least protable markets. Carriers
can also downsize capacity within a market by adjusting the number of seats o¤ered
8Lessors forced an involuntary liquidation of Sun Country Airlines. The FAA grounded Kiwi
Airlines, MarkAir, and ProAir for safety concerns, training and maintenance violations. Unless the
airline is already under court protection, the FAA grounding precipitates a bankruptcy ling.
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and the number of performed departures. The freed capacity can be reallocated to
markets that are more protable.9
Under bankruptcy, the insolvent carrier can implement cost-cutting strategies that
are illegal outside of court protection, thus facilitating the rms return to protability.
Under Section 1110 of Chapter 11, a bankrupt carrier that has defaulted on its
aircraft lease payments has a 60 day grace period to make lease payments and keep
the aircraft. If after 60 days the carrier has not paid its outstanding lease, the
lessor can re-possess the aircraft. Rarely have lessors repossessed aircrafts.10 Most
lessors are willing to renegotiate payments with the bankrupt carrier because a lessor
who repossesses a plane would have to redeploy it elsewhere, and if the industry is in
distress, that might be more costly than extending payment schedules or renegotiating
payment terms. Furthermore, since rescinded leases become a general unsecured
claim on the carrier, the ca rrier has a strong bargaining position with their lessor.11
In rare instances, lessors force a Chapter 11 ling over missed lease payments.12 One
of the largest burdens a¤ecting most carriers are obligations to employees and retirees
through dened benet pension programs. Most legacy carriers under bankruptcy
protection use their bankruptcy lings to renegotiate or renege on their dened benet
pension obligations. Doing so transfers the burden of pension obligations to taxpayers
via the Federal Pension Benet Guarantee Corporation (PBGC).13 Cost reductions
resulting from changes in dened benet pension programs should outlast the rms
9 In particular, Sections 1110 and 1113 of Chapter 11 facilitate these strategic changes as they
allow the bankrupt carrier to adjust capacity without incurring major costs or contract violations,
by granting insolvent carriers the freedom to rescind leases on gates, hangars, and aircraft, and to
unilaterally modify labor agreements. For instance, Delta rejected and restructured dozens of leases
at the Tampa, Dallas and Orlando airports.
10Repossessions have occurred for small carriers: MarkAir (second bankruptcy), Western Pacic,
and Sun Country.
11During Continentals second bankruptcy ling 12 aircraft leasing companies agreed to defer,
reduce, or forgive lease payments on 98 planes in Continentals eet. America West negotiated rent
relief on aircarfts leased from Ansett Worldwide Aviation Services. ATA returned 18 planes to lessor
General Electric. Delta Airlines requested court approval to reject leases on its aircrafts.
12Lessors of USAir considered ling a lawsuit against the carrier. But Brad Gupta, the president
of Ameriquest Holdings, a USAir lessor, publicly stated on July 25; 2002 that would leave the lessor
facing lower lease rates and lower demand for rejected leases. This discouraged the lessors lawsuit.
13Under United Airlines reorganization plan, the PBGC took over all four of the airlines under-
funded pension plans. Immediately after ling for Chapter 11, Northwest and Delta Airlines sought
court permission to cut o¤ payments to the bulk of the retirement annuities received by thousands
of former employees.
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stay under bankruptcy protection. Labor union contracts heavily burden the airline
industry. Renegotiations with unions and employees is a key cost-saving strategy in
which airlines engage while operating under protection. The threat that the carrier
can be forced into liquidation, leaving employees jobless, makes labor unions and
employees more willing to renegotiate than they would otherwise be. Under Section
1113 of Chapter 11, an airline can unilaterally modify labor agreements if negotiations
turn out to be unsuccessful.14 Just the threat that the bankrupt carrier can turn to
Section 1113 shifts most of the bargaining power to the airline.
A bankruptcy ling can a¤ect consumerswillingness to pay for the services that
the insolvent rm provides. Such a negative demand shock might reverse once the
carrier exits bankruptcy. Reputation costs associated with a bankruptcy ling can
reduce the demand for the carriers ights. Opler and Titman (1994) show that
highly leveraged rms lose substantial market share to their more conservatively
nanced competitors during industry downturns. Similarly, bankrupt rms (which
represent the extreme case of excessive leverage) might lose signicant market share
to competitors. Safety consideration aside, passengers might still prefer to y non-
bankrupt carriers if they are concerned that the insolvent rm will not honor its
frequent ier obligations. Passengers have voiced concerns that, even if the carrier
emerges from bankruptcy, frequent ier miles might not be honored.15 This can drive
demand away from the distressed carrier to its non-distressed competitor.
3 Data Description
Our data is an original compilation from several sources. From the Air Transportation
Association Web site, Lynn LoPuckis Bankruptcy Database, and Factiva and Lexis-
14When USAirs mechanics wouldnt join other unions in making voluntary concessions, the car-
riers CEO, David Siegel, led for Chapter 11. The carriers ability to void labor contracts with the
bankruptcy judges approval allowed Siegel to win concessions from the mechanics. During United
Airlines reorganization, the carrier led a motion with the bankruptcy court to void the unionslabor
contracts and impose new terms to signicantly cut the carriers expenses. Notice that Section 1113
is not specic to airlines, while Section 1110 is.
15A December 11; 2002 article in the WSJ reveals Uniteds concern with reputation e¤ects following
its bankruptcy ling: United Airlines has launched a national advertising campaign to reassure
customers that it will keep ying following its bankruptcy-law ling,...The all-text, black-and-white
ads assure customers that United, a unit of UAL, is honoring tickets and frequent-ier miles.
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Nexis reports, we obtain the identity of carriers ling for bankruptcy, the dates on
which each carrier entered and exited court protection, and the specic way in which
each carrier emerged from protection. We merge this dataset with data from The On-
Time Performance Schedule gathered by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics
(BTS); the T-100 Domestic Segment of Form 41 reported by the BTS; the Origin
and Destination Surveys (DB1B), which is a ten percent sample of airline tickets sold
by airlines within a quarter.
3.1 Carriers, Markets, and Routes
We consider nine national carriers between 1997 and 2007: American (identied by
its airline code, AA), Continental (CO), Delta (DL), America West (HP; until the
third quarter of 2005), Northwest (NW ), Trans World Airlines (TWA, until the
second quarter of 2001), United (UA), USAir (US), and Southwest (WN). Low
cost carriers are grouped in a category labeled LCC (e.g., Jet Blue and Frontier
are in the LCC group).16 This allows us to keep small carriers that are present in
only a few markets or for a few quarters when we include route-carrier xed e¤ects.
Furthermore, it allows us to use a meaningful grouping that captures the impact of
small carrier presence in the market. In the LCC category we exclude three low
cost carriers which we choose to study independently: Airtran (FL), ATA (TZ), and
National (N7). We do this because they either had a strong presence (Airtran) or
they led for Chapter 11 during our sample period (ATA and National).17
Next, we identify airlines that have led for bankruptcy protection between 1997
and 2007. There are six carriers operating under bankruptcy protection during our
sample period: United Airlines (December 9, 2002 through February 2, 2006), USAir
(August 11, 2002 through March 31, 2003 and then again September 12, 2004 through
16For each route-year-quarter, we take the averages across the low cost carriers for the control
variables.
17 In the LCC category we include: Trans States Airlines, Aloha Airlines, Alaska Airlines, Jetblue
Airways, UltrAir, Atlantic Southeast Airlines, Frontier Airlines, Tower Air, Allegiant Air, Hawaiian
Airlines, Business Express, Valujet Airlines, Midway Airlines, Kiwi International, Legend Airlines,
Vanguard Airlines, Spirit Air Lines, Pro Air, Pan American Airways Corp., Reno Air, Sunworld
Intl Airlines, Sun Country Airlines, Tristar Airlines, Western Pacic Airlines, Eastwind Airlines,
Air South, Mesaba Airlines, Mesa Airlines, Midwest Airlines, Accessair Holdings.
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September 27, 2005), ATA (October 26; 2004 through February 28, 2006), Delta
(September 14, 2005 through May 1, 2007), and Northwest (September 14, 2005
through May 31, 2007). Some small carriers operated under court protection for a
small time window, and thus we cannot consider these carriers independently (E.g.,
Independence Air operated under court protection between November 7, 2005 and
January 5, 2006).18
We dene a market, denoted by m, as an airport-to-airport trip, irrespective of the
number of connections.19 A route, denoted by r, is a non-stop airport-to-airport trip.
We consider all airport-to-airport pairs between the top 50 Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (MSAs), ranked by population size.
We have four units of observation, which vary by the dataset used in each regres-
sion. First, to study the frequency of services, seats, and load factor, the unit of
observation is a carrier, route, year, quarter, combination. Second, we study prices
using a carrier, market, year, quarter unit of observation. Third, to study a carriers
network extent out of an airport, the unit of observation is carrier, airport, year,
quarter specic. Finally, for the analysis of the number of markets served in a given
quarter, by a given carrier, we use a carrier, year, quarter unit of observation
We denote carriers by j; airports by a = 1; :::; A; airport-to-airport routes by
r = 1; :::; R; airport-to-airport markets by m = 1; :::;M ; and time period by t =
1; :::T . For example, the combination jrt indicates that airline j (e.g. American)
transports its passengers on route r (Chicago OHare to Fort Lauderdale Airport) at
time t (e.g. the second quarter of 2002). In the rest of the analysis, we let g denote
the geographical scope of the analysis: thus, g 2 fr;m; a; ng, where n indicates that
the information is at the national level and the unit of observation is a carrier-year-
quarter. When g = n there is no cross-section variation across markets, and we only
have time-series variation.
18We exclude TWAs third bankruptcy even though it occurred during our sample period because
the rm stayed under bankruptcy protection for less than one quarter. For an analysis of prepackaged
bankruptcies, see Carapeto, 2005. We also exclude Chapter 7 lings because in that case rms
liquidate, and we do not have information on prices or other strategic variables under liquidation.
19For example, one market is Chicago OHare (ORD) to Washington Dulles (IAD) and another
market is Chicago Midway (MDW) to Washington National (DCA).
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3.2 Bankruptcy Categorical Variables
We dene the set of K carriers that led for bankruptcy protection at some point as
 =

UA;US(1st); US(2nd); NW;DL; TZ;N7
	
. Notice that USAir led for Chapter
11 twice. We use the subscript k = 1; :::;K to denote a bankrupt rm (K is equal
to 7). We want to distinguish the e¤ect that bankruptcy lings have on the quality
measures we consider, for the bankrupt rm, and for its competitors, during the time
when the bankrupt rm operates under Chapter 11, as well as after the rm emerges
from bankruptcy protection. To measure these e¤ects, we construct the following
categorical variables. First, we dene Bktgt equal to 1 if there is at least one carrier
under bankruptcy protection at time t and that carrier provides service in g (for
example, if g = r, then it provides service in route r), otherwise, Bktgt is equal to
zero. For each quality measure, we study the average e¤ect of bankruptcy across
markets and across bankrupt and non-bankrupt carriers. Next, we ask whether any
observed price changes during bankruptcy persist once the bankrupt rm emerges
from court protection. To do this, we dene the categorical variable AftBktgt equal
to 1 if there is at least one carrier that was under bankruptcy protection at a time
before t; and that carrier currently serves g. Otherwise, AftBktgt is equal to zero.
3.3 Networks, Capacity, and Prices
We measure the extent to which a carriers downsizing a¤ects the number of markets
served at the national level. We use the scheduling database to construct the count
of origin-destination airport pairs by operating carrier, year, and quarter. We call
NationalNetworkjt the total number of airport-airport combinations served by car-
rier j during year-quarter t.20 Table 2 shows that on average a carrier serves 446:14
markets over the US.
We build a measure of a carriers network out of the airport of origin using the
scheduling data. The variable AirportNetworkjat equals the number of routes served
out of airport a; by carrier j; in year-quarter t:21 Table 2 shows that on average a
20Notice that for simplicity we have omitted g = n in the subscript of this variable.
21This is a very important variable in the empirical literature of the airline industry. In particular,
it captures the relative attractiveness of an airlines frequent yer program and its other services at
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carrier serves 19 markets out of an airport.
We evaluate the ight frequency for each specic route. There has been active
research on the importance of ight frequency as a determinant of air travel demand.22
An airline that provides a single ight per day between two airports is forcing a large
fraction of travelers to y at a time which is going to be less attractive than the one
o¤ered by an airline that provides two or more ights per day between the same two
airports. To construct a measure of the ight frequency between two airports, we
use the scheduling database which provides information on the number of ights that
each carrier schedules and performs in each market, during a year-quarter period.
We compute the sum of the number of scheduled departures between two airports by
operating carrier, route, year, and quarter. Frequencyjrt equals the total number of
departures performed in route r, on year-quarter t, by carrier j. Table 2 shows that
on average rms o¤er 362:29 ights per quarter in each route.
The T   100 Domestic Segment of Form 41 reported by the BTS provides data
on an airlines capacity, measured by available seats, denoted by Seatsjrt. Table 2
shows that on average a carrier transports 45; 846:46 seats per quarter.
We dene a carriers load factor on a route during a year-quarter as the ratio of
the sum of all passengers transported in a market during a year-quarter to the sum
of all available seats for sale on that market, during that year-quarter. We denote
the load factor by LoadFactorjrt.
To summarize the airline pricing behavior we use the median prices in a market
m, denoted by Farejmt, to exploit information on the distribution of prices available
from the DB1B dataset while using as few statistics as possible.23 We code a round-
the origin and destination airports (the number of ticket counters, customer service desks, etc.). See
Berry (1990,1992), Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (2006), Bamberger and Carlton (2003), Brueckner,
Dyer, and Spiller (1992), Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), Ciliberto and Williams (2009).
22Previous work looking at ight frequency as a means for airlines to di¤erentiate their products
have looked at the relationship between ight frequency and mergers (Richard, 2003), market com-
petition (Borenstein and Netz, 1999), the nature of airline networks (Brueckner and Zhang, 2001),
and economies of tra¢ c density (Brueckner and Spiller, 1994)
23We drop: tickets that are neither one-way nor round-trip travel, such as open-jaw trip tickets;
tickets involving a US-nonreporting carrier ying within North America and foreign carrier ying
between two US points; tickets that are part of international travel; tickets including travel on more
than one airline on a directional trip (known as interline tickets); tickets involving non-contiguous
domestic travel (Hawaii, Alaska, and Territories); tickets with fares less than 20 dollars or larger than
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trip ticket as one directional trip ticket, which costs half the full round-trip ticket
fare. Fares are measured in 1993 dollars. Table 2 shows that the average fare for a
one-way ticket is 126:46 dollars.
4 Identication and Empirical Specication
The objective of our paper is to compare route structure, prices, and capacities
before, during, and after bankruptcy. The main concern is the following: As the rm
sinks deeper into nancial distress, it might change its strategic decisions, like prices,
capacity, and network extent to generate the cash it needs to avoid bankruptcy, but
this can lead the rm deeper into nancial distress, and ultimately to a Chapter 11
ling. This strategy is likely to be the rms desperate attempt to raise cash to avoid
the bankruptcy ling, and therefore, it is likely to occur in the period immediately
preceding bankruptcy. As a result of this pre-bankruptcy behavior, we might estimate
a lower pre-bankruptcy average price just because of the rapid drop in prices in the
quarters before the bankruptcy ling.
This problem is conceptually the same as the one in Ashenfelter (1978). In a study
of the e¤ect of training programs on earnings Ashenfelter noted that all trainees suf-
fered unpredicted earning declines in the year prior to entering a training program (see
Ashenfelter (1978, page 51)). This stylized fact has become known as the Ashen-
felter dip. Simple comparisons of earnings before and after the training program
would be misleading evidence of the e¤ect of training on earnings. To deal with
this, Ashenfelter dropped the period immediately preceding training (see Ashenfelter
(1978, page 53)). The analogy with our problem of prices and bankruptcy ling is
clear: Prices could fall prior to bankruptcy and this would dampen the di¤erences in
the prices before, during, and after the bankruptcy ling.
We follow Ashenfelter (1978) and drop observations corresponding to two quar-
ters prior to the to-be-bankrupt rms bankruptcy ling date and corresponding to
9999 dollars; and tickets whose fares were in the bottom and top 5 percentile percentile in their year;
tickets with more than 6 coupons. We then merge this dataset with the T-100 Domestic Segment
(U.S. Carriers) and drop tickets for ights that have less than 12 departures over a quarter in one
direction (this means less than 1 departure every week in one direction).
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markets where this rm was present.24 To further address this concern, we apply a
dynamic program evaluation approach: We look at the average values of the variable
of interest (e.g. price) one quarter before, two quarters before, and three quarters
before the rms bankruptcy ling. The key point is to see whether there is ev-
idence of signicant changes in prices preceding the bankruptcy ling. Next, we
worry about the possibility of persistent correlation of negative unobserved current
and expected demand shifts (that extend beyond the pre-bankruptcy period we elim-
inate) in markets served by the bankrupt airlines relative to that in markets served
by other airlines. We address this second concern by following Friedberg (1998),
and include linear market time trends to control for such market-specic unobserv-
able correlations across time. Further, price changes triggered by demand changes
spurring from seasonal or exogenous shocks (e.g. increases in fuel costs or 9/11) can
confound the e¤ects of bankruptcy on prices. Serially correlated industry-specic
shocks to demand can also confound the e¤ects of bankruptcies on prices. To address
this, we include year-quarter xed e¤ects. Furthermore, a carrier ying on a certain
time schedule might benet business travel in some markets but not in others, a¤ect-
ing the price behavior of that carrier in those markets, but not in others.25 Ignoring
these sources of unobservable heterogeneity associated with an airlines pricing be-
havior can confound the e¤ects of bankruptcy lings on prices. To address this, we
include route-carrier xed e¤ects. Finally, a carriers presence in a market can have
an e¤ect on the behavior of other carriers in that market, regardless of whether the
carrier is bankrupt. Thus, we di¤erentiate the e¤ect of a bankruptcy ling from the
e¤ect that just the presence of a rm in the market has by including the categorical
variable INgt. The variable INgt switches on when at least one bankrupt rm is in
g (recall that if g = r, then we would say that at least one bankrupt rm is in route
r) at time t. This variable is likely a function of the same unobservables that a¤ect
the pricing decisions. This leads us to discuss the issue of sample selection.
There are two sources of sample selection. The rst is related to the self-selection
24We repeat the analysis excluding the preceding 4 quarters and nd qualitatively similar results.
25Another example: A carrier in a given market might use more modern planes than other carriers
in that market, a¤ecting the price that all carriers in that market can charge.
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of the rms into markets. In the literature, this problem is addressed by following
Veerbek and Nijman (1992), who consider the selectivity bias of the xed and ran-
dom e¤ects estimators and show that the xed e¤ect estimator is more robust to
nonresponse biases than the random e¤ects estimator. The second sample selection
issue refers to the selection of markets, since we do not have a balanced panel. Thus,
following Veerbek and Nijman (1992), we need to use market xed e¤ects. In this
paper, we include route-carrier or market-carrier xed e¤ects to address this concern,
which clearly control for market (or route) and carrier xed e¤ects. To study the
empirical importance of sample selection we present results when we run regressions
with random e¤ects and compare them with the results we obtain when we include
xed e¤ects. We show that sample selection is not an issue of empirical signicance
in our analysis, since the results are not di¤erent.
We estimate the following econometric specication:
lnQjgt = 
OWNBktOwngt + 
OTHBktOthersgt (1)
+OWNAftBktOwngt + 
OTHAftBktOthersgt + "jgt;
where "jgt is the remaining component of the regression to be discussed in detail be-
low. Here, Qjgt is one of the measures discussed in Section (3.3): NationalNetworkjt;
AirportNetworkjat; F requencyjrt, Seatsjrt, Farejmt, and LoadFactorjrt: These de-
pendent variables are run on two sets of bankruptcy categorical variables. The rst
indicates whether a competitor in a market currently operates under bankruptcy
protection, and the second indicates whether any of the rms competing in a market
previously operated under bankruptcy.
The coe¢ cient OWN measures the current e¤ect of a bankruptcy ling on the
bankrupt rms variable Qjgt. The current e¤ect on the bankrupts rm competitors
is measured by OTH . The post-bankruptcy e¤ects are measured by OWN and
OTHER. Table 3 illustrates how we identify the parameters of the regression. Note
that changes after a rms bankruptcy are computed over all quarters from the rms
bankruptcy emergence until the end of the sample period, and in the case of USAir
that has multiple bankruptcy lings over quarters from one bankruptcy emergence
14
until the next bankruptcy ling. Similarly, the pre-bankruptcy period is dened as all
quarters between the beginning of the sample period until the rms bankruptcy ling ;
and for the second USAir bankruptcy it is over the quarters between lings.
We let "jgt be dened as follows:
"jgt = ut + ujt if g = n (unit of observation is carrier-year-quarter),
"jgt = Ingt + ujg + ut + ujgt + o(g)o (g)gt  Trendt + d(g)d (g)gt  Trendt if g = r;m;
"jgt = Inat + uja + ut + ujat + a  a  Trendt if g = a.
Ingt is the variable that controls for whether one of the rms that is ling for
bankruptcy is in g at any point in time; ujg is a g-carrier xed e¤ect, for example
a route-carrier xed e¤ect when we look at prices; ut is a year-quarter xed e¤ect;
and ujgt is an idiosyncractic unobservable. Trendt is a time trend variable, taking
values from 1 to 48. o(g) is the parameter of the origin-specic time trend, where
o (g) is the origin airport of route r or market m. d(g) is dened similarly. a is
the parameter of the origin-specic time trend when the unit of observation is the
airport-year-quarter. We cluster observations as recommended by Bertrand, Duo,
and Mullainathan (2004), who show that without the appropriate clustering, xed
e¤ects regressions produce inconsistent standard errors.26 In addition, we report
the marginal e¤ect corresponding to the coe¢ cient of the dummy variables in the
semilogarithmic regression equations.27
26The appropriate clustering depends on how we think that airlines behave. If, as assumed by
the literature (for example, Brueckner, Dyer and Spiller (1992), Berry (1990) Borenstein (1989),
Berry and Jia (2010)) airlines treat each route as an independent regional market then the clustering
should be by route. This is what Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) do in their recent work. We follow their
approach and in all of our regressions we cluster the unobservables by route if the unit of observation
is the route-carrier-year-quarter. We cluster by airport if the unit of observation is the airport-carrier-
year-quarter. And we cluster by market if the unit of observation is the market-carrier-year-quarter.
27 In order to interpret the coe¢ cients of the dummy variables in the semilogarithmic regression
equation above we need to transform the estimates. This is because in a semilog regression the
coe¢ cient of a dummy variable, multiplied by 100, is not equal to the percentage e¤ect of that variable
on the variable being explained. Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) show that to give the estimated
coe¢ cient a percentage interpretation, we need to transform the coe¢ cient as follows. If the estimated
coe¢ cient is ^OWN then the percentage e¤ect of BktOwnrt on Qjrt is ~
OWN = exp(^OWN )   1: We
report the estimated coe¢ cient and the correct percentage e¤ect in the tables. The latter is reported
in squared brackets below the standard errors.
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5 The E¤ect of Bankruptcy Filings on Airline Networks
5.1 National Networks
The dependent variable for equation (1) in Table 4, is the natural logarithm of
NationalNetworkjt and equals the number of origin and destination airport pairs
served by carrier j at time t. In this specication we do not include year-quarter xed
e¤ects because we cannot use variation in the identity and number of participants in a
local market to identify the e¤ect of bankruptcy lings. Here, the level of geographical
detail is the whole US.
Column 1 presents the main specication, where we include carrier xed e¤ects
and we drop observations corresponding to two quarters prior the lings. We estimate
OWN equal to  0:233; OTHER equal to 0:256; OWN equal to  0:471; nally,
OTHER equal to 0:259. They are all precisely estimated.
The economic signicance of each coe¢ cient can be gauged by looking at the
corresponding square bracket, which reports the transformed coe¢ cient as described
above. In particular, OWN equal to  0:233 means that on average rms reduce the
number of markets that they serve by 20:8 percentage when they are under Chapter
11.28 After emerging from bankruptcy protection, rms that led for bankruptcy
protection serve 37:5 percentage fewer of the markets that they were serving before
ling for Chapter 11 To understand why we nd such a strong e¤ect, recall that
our unit of observation is a carrier-year-quarter. So, each carrier is approximately
weighted in an equal way when we estimate the average coe¢ cients. This means that
the changes in the number of markets implemented by small carriers carry as much
weight as the ones implemented by the large carriers in the coe¢ cient estimates.
To see why this observation is important, in Column 2 we exclude ATA from the
dataset. Immediately we notice that the estimate of OWN drops to  0:275, which
corresponds to a change of  24 percent in the number of markets served.
Now consider the e¤ect of bankruptcy lings on the number of markets served
by the rivals of the bankrupt rms. We nd that the rivals increase the number of
28The percentage e¤ect is calculated as above, ~OWN = exp( 0:595)  1 = 44:8%:
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the markets they serve by almost 30 percent. This change is permanent. Again this
e¤ect is very large. In the other columns we will see that such e¤ect is closer to 20
percent. Column 3 presents the results when we do not use Ashenfelters solution,
that is we do not drop observations corresponding to two quarters prior the lings.
The results are similar to those in Column 1, which is the rst piece of evidence that
the endogeneity of the bankruptcy dummies is not empirically signicant. Column
4 presents the results when we also exclude the carrier xed e¤ects. Notice that the
parameters are estimated almost equal to those ion Column 3, suggesting that rm
specic heterogeneity is not a concern in the empirical question that we address in
this paper.
We conclude the table with Column 5, where we follow a dynamic program
evaluation approach. Instead of dropping observations corresponding to two quarters
prior to the ling, we add lag values of the bankruptcy categorical variables. Formally,
we estimate the coe¢ cients of BktOwng;t 1, BktOwng;t 2, BktOthersg;t 1 , and BktOthersg;t 2 . If the
bankruptcy dummies are exogenous, the results should be the same in Column 1 and
Column 5. Moreover, the lag bankruptcy dummies should be neither statistically nor
economically signicant. This is exactly what we nd.
Overall, the results suggest that there is very strong impact of bankruptcy lings
on the number of markets served by bankrupt rm, but and on the number of markets
served by its rivals. When looking at these results we need to keep in mind that no
time specic controls (i.e. year-quarter xed e¤ects) are included in the estimation
because we cannot separately estimate the e¤ect of the time variables and that of
the bankruptcy dummies. Next, we will consider the case where we use variation
in local markets and then we can see how robust this rst set of results is to more
controls.
5.2 Airport Networks
In Table 5 the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of AirportNetworkjat:
Recall that this is the natural logarithm of the total number of markets served by
carrier j out of airport a at time t.
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Column 1 presents the results under the main specication, where we include
airport-carrier xed e¤ects; year-quarter xed e¤ects; origin specic time trends;
and we drop observations corresponding to two quarters prior the lings. With
AirportNetworkjat as the dependent variable we estimate OWN equal to  0:302
and OWN equal to  0:270. Both of these parameters are estimated precisely, and
they should be interpreted as corresponding to a 25 percent drop in the bankrupt
carriers network extent out of airports during and after the ling. Interestingly the
rivals of the bankrupt carrier also lower their network extent during bankruptcy l-
ings, but increase it by 8 percent after the emergence of the bankrupt rm from
Chapter 11. The e¤ects on the rivals is thus much smaller than what we found in
Table 4. This suggests that aggregate time shocks, such as 9/11, are important
determinants of the number of markets served by carriers.
Column 2 reports the results when we do not drop observations corresponding
to two quarters prior the lings. The results are analogous to those in Column 1,
again conrming that the potential endogeneity of the bankruptcy dummies, while
in theory a serious concern, in practice is not empirically signicant. Column 3
reports estimates from a regression that excludes origin-time trends. We notice that
the results are the same as those inColumns 1 and 2, suggesting that, at least for this
dependent variable there is no reason to be concerned about persistent correlation
of negative unobserved current and expected demand shifts (that extend beyond
the pre-bankruptcy period we eliminate) at airports served by the bankrupt airlines
relative to other airports. In Column 4 we exclude carrier-origin xed e¤ects. So
this is a random e¤ect regression, where the random component is a carrier-origin
unobservable. Notice that the estimated coe¢ cient are remarkably smaller in this
column than in Columns 1-3, where we include xed e¤ects. This conrms the
nding of Table 4 that heterogeneity across carriers is signicant. In Column 5
we implement a dynamic program evaluation approach, along the same lines as in
Column 5 of Table 4. First, we observe that the estimates of OWN , OTH , OWN ,
and OTH are the same as in Column 1. This again suggests that the estimated
coe¢ cient are not biased by the potential endogeneity of the bankruptcy dummies.
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Second, we notice that one of the lagged dummies is statistically signicant and its
magnitude is quite large. We interpret this as evidence that, prior to bankruptcy, the
insolvent rm implements changes in its network extent, but the magnitude of such
changes are not precisely estimated.
Overall the results of Table 5 conrm a strong e¤ect of bankruptcy lings on the
route structure of airline rms. Bankrupt carriers drop markets at all their airports,
with an average change of approximately 25 percent. This is clearly a strong e¤ect.
6 The E¤ect of Bankruptcy Filings on Capacity Choices
6.1 Flights Frequency
The dependent variable for the regression equation (1) in Table 6 is the natural
logarithm of Frequencyjrt, where frequency is dened as the total number of ights
served by carrier j in the route r at time t (a year-quarter).
Column 1 presents the results of the main specication, when we include route-
carrier xed e¤ects, year-quarter xed e¤ects, origin and destination specic time
trends, and we drop observations corresponding to two quarters prior the lings.
We estimate OWN equal to  0:242 and OWN equal to  0:397, both statistically
signicant. In contrast, OTH and OTH are small and imprecisely estimated. The
estimates of OWN and OWN show that bankrupt carriers drop the number of
ights in the routes they serve by 21:5 percent during the bankruptcy ling and
by 32:8 after their emergence from Chapter 11. The results in Column 2, where
we do not drop observations corresponding to two quarters prior the lings, suggest
that there is no much evidence of an endogeneity bias of the bankruptcy dummies,
since the results are the same as in Column 1. Similarly, the results in Column 3,
where we exclude the origin and destination specic time trends are also essentially
the same as in Column 1. The results in Column 4 show that year-quarter xed
e¤ects are crucial to identify the e¤ect of bankruptcy ling on ight frequency. If
we do not include year-quarter xed e¤ects, we nd that frequency drops by 13:7
percent instead of 21:5 percent during the ling. We nd that frequency drops by
23:3 percent instead of 32:8 percent after the emergence from bankruptcy. Thus,
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there are temporal shocks that play an important role in determining the frequency
decisions, which can confound the e¤ect of bankruptcy lings on frequency. Instead,
Column 5 shows that route-carrier xed e¤ects are not crucial for the results. Thus,
unobserved heterogeneity across route-carriers is not as important as in Tables 4
and 5. In Column 6 we implement a dynamic program evaluation approach. There
is some small evidence that the bankrupt rm might have started to change its ight
frequency before the ling, but those changes were minimal, compared to those during
and after the bankruptcy ling. Notice that the estimates of the main parameters, ,
are the same as in Column 1. Together with the results in Columns 1 and 2, this
suggests that the bankruptcy dummies are not endogenous in this regression.
6.2 Capacity
The dependent variable for the regression equation (1) in Table 7 is the natural
logarithm of Seatsjrt, which is the total number of seats served by carrier j in the
route r at time t.
Column 1 presents the results of the main specication, when we include route-
carrier xed e¤ects, year-quarter xed e¤ects, origin and destination specic time
trends, and we drop observations corresponding to two quarters prior the lings. We
estimate OWN equal to  0:351 and OWN equal to  0:426, both statistically signif-
icant. OTH is estimated equal to  0:036 and OTH equal to  0:059, and both are
precisely estimated. In economic terms this means that bankrupt rms drop their
capacity (seats) by 29:6 percent during the bankruptcy ling and by 34:7 percent af-
ter the emergence from Chapter 11. Their rivals drop some of their capacity, but the
e¤ect is much smaller, around 5 percent both during and after the bankruptcy ling.
Columns 2-5 show that the results do not change if we do not drop observations
corresponding to two quarters prior the lings, if we drop the origin and destina-
tion time trends, if we drop year-quarter xed e¤ects, and if we drop route-carrier
xed e¤ects. Columns 6 shows that a dynamic program evaluation approach leads
to identical results. Again, there is no evidence that the bankruptcy dummies are
endogenous, or, at the very least, their endogeneity is not empirically important.
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7 The E¤ect of Bankruptcy Filings on Prices
In this Section we reconcile the evidence on the e¤ects of Chapter 11 on capacity and
network structure with the evidence on prices. We ask the following questions: How
do prices change? What happens to the demand faced by the bankrupt rm? Finally,
what are the e¤ects of the bankruptcy lings on the marginal costs of transporting a
passenger?
The dependent variable for the regression equation (1) in Table 8 is the natural
logarithm of Farejmt, which is the median price charged by carrier j in market m at
time t.
Column 1 reports results when we include market-carrier xed e¤ects, year-
quarter xed e¤ects, origin and destination specic time trends, and we drop ob-
servations corresponding to two quarters prior the lings. Our estimate of OWN
equals  0:031 and OWN equals 0:044. This means that rms lower their prices by 3
percent while under bankruptcy protection, and raise them by 4:4 percent after their
emergence from Chapter 11. We nd that the rivals do not change their price in any
statistically or economically signicant way, and this result is robust across the six
specications in Table 8.
The most surprising result here is that prices actually increase after the emergence
from bankruptcy protection. That is the rst indication that bankruptcy lings
might not be e¤ectively reduce the (marginal) costs of operation.
Column 2 reports results when we do not drop observations corresponding to two
quarters prior the lings. The results are indistinguishable from those in Column 1.
The results in Column 3 show that persistent correlation of negative unobserved,
current and expected, demand shifts is an important concern. The estimated e¤ect on
prices are very di¤erent in Columns 1 and 3. In Column 1 we estimated OWN equal
to  0:031, while now it is equal to  0:056, almost twice as large. The di¤erence in
the estimated OWN is even larger. In Column 1, we estimated OWN equal to 0:044,
while in Column 3 we estimate OWN equal to  0:010. We will return to this unob-
served correlation when we study the results presented in Column 6, where we show
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that the linear trends adequately control for it. Column 4 excludes year-quarter
xed e¤ects, and this signicantly alters our results. The coe¢ cient OWN equals
 0:093, which would mean that under in-bankruptcy airline rms charge prices that
are almost 10 percent lower than in the pre-bankruptcy period. OWN equals  0:032,
suggesting that some part of the price drop is permanent. Clearly, the conclusions of
our analysis would be di¤erent if we did not control for unobserved temporal shocks,
such as 9/11: We would conclude that bankruptcy lings lead to lower prices both
during and after the time when a rm is under Chapter 11 protection. In Column
5 we report results for a specication with route-carrier random e¤ects. The results
are essentially identical to those in Column 1. This means that the changes in prices
are estimated to be the same whether we use variation in prices in markets where
bankrupt airlines are present before, during, and after a bankruptcy ling or whether
we use variation in prices in all markets. This is important for two reasons. First, it
suggests that there are no selection problems since the results are the same whether
or not we include route-carrier xed e¤ects. Second, this eliminates the unlikely but
potentially troubling possibility that identication is just o¤ routes that airlines keep
while in bankruptcy but drop them upon emerging. Column 6 presents the results
when we follow a dynamic program evaluation approach. Recall that this approach
is useful to see the extent to which prices set by bankrupt rms are di¤erent on time-
varying unobservables that are not adequately captured by either the year-quarter
xed e¤ects or origin/destination linear trends. Given the magnitude of the results
for prices, we include three lags, instead of two as in the previous tables. First, we
nd that OWN and OWN take the same values as in Column 1. Second, we notice
that the lagged variables are small in magnitude and decline as we move further back
in time from the bankruptcy ling date. Thus, we conclude that there might still be
some di¤erence on time-varying unobservables which is not picked up by the year-
quarter xed e¤ects or by the origin/destination linear trends, but such di¤erence
does not signicantly a¤ect the estimates of the parameters OWN and OWN .
Next, we ask what is the e¤ect of bankruptcy on a carriers load factor. A carriers
load factor is the ratio of passengers own over the number of seats, by a carrier j,
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in route r, in year-quarter t; and captures airline js capacity utilization. This is
interesting because the load factor is an indicator that tells us about the demand
faced by the airlines for the following reason. We know that the bankruptcy carrier
dropped its capacity and prices did not change much. If the load factor remain
unchanged or is smaller, then this means that the bankrupt carrier must be facing a
lower demand. If the load factor increased, then this means that the bankrupt carrier
might have actually experienced an increase in its demand.
Table 9 considers the case where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm
of the load factor of carrier j, in route r, at year-quarter t, LoadFactorjrt. We
only run one specication, where we include market-carrier xed e¤ects, year-quarter
xed e¤ects, origin and destination specic time trends, and we drop observations
corresponding to two quarters prior the lings.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 9 show that the bankrupt rms load factor declines
during and after its bankruptcy ling. We know from Table 7 that the bankrupt
rm decreases the number of seats available. Together, these results suggest that
the bankrupt carriers demand fell, and though the rm decreased capacity and price
during bankruptcy, the price fall was not enough to generate a high capacity uti-
lization rate (load factor). The load factor of the competitors increases, suggesting
an unambiguous shift in demand towards non-bankrupt carriers. The e¤ect on the
bankrupt carriers demand is somewhat reversed after the rm emerges from bank-
ruptcy, since the emerging carrier is able to increase prices by more than 5 percent
even though its planes are not as fully utilized as before the ling.
7.1 Prices and Marginal Costs
To investigate further why prices do not change much during and after bankruptcy
lings, we study the marginal cost of transporting a passenger. Recall that a Chapter
11 ling can grant the bankrupt rm a cost advantage over its competitors, poten-
tially explaining the marginal fall in prices observed while the rm operates under
bankruptcy. Cost savings are expected to last even after the rm emerges from bank-
ruptcy, or at least for a short time following the rms emergence. To investigate the
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explanatory power of cost driven price changes, we study changes in the marginal
cost of a seat before, during, and after each bankruptcy ling. Before we discuss this
alternative explanation, it is useful to discuss in more detail the nature of marginal
costs in the airline industry, and the distinction between accounting and economic
opportunity cost.
The accounting marginal cost of a seat is just the passenger cost associated with
issuing tickets, processing passengers through the gate, in-ight food and beverages,
and insurance and other liability expenses. This cost is very small relative to the
xed costs faced by an airline to y a plane on a route. However, as Elzinga and
Mills [forthcoming] convincingly argue, the economic opportunity cost is the price
of the ticket that could have been charged to another passenger to y on that same
plane but through a connection between two di¤erent airports. This measure of the
economic marginal cost is not observable because we do not have the information
to know what passengers the airline could have own on that same seat. Yet, we
know the lowest price that the airline charged in a quarter. The idea here is that a
reasonable approximation of the economic marginal cost is the lowest ticket fare that
a carrier charged across all of its routes.29 Notice that our denition of economic
marginal cost of a seat is very helpful to clarify an apparent paradox of the role
of bankruptcy lings in the airline industry. On one hand, while under bankruptcy
protection an airline might be able to decrease the usual business overhead costs, such
as costs associated with sta¤ functions, general administration, brand marketing, and
common-use property. On the other hand, the same airline might still be unable
to lower its operating costs, which are associated with route specic marginal costs,
such as aircraft maintenance costs or fuel costs. Thus, a bankruptcy ling can be
very successful at lowering the xed overhead costs, but not the marginal cost of a
seat. The failure of the airlines to lower their operating marginal cost is exactly what
we show next.
First, we consider the traditional cost measure used in the airline industry, average
29This notion of economic marginal cost seems to be already in Borenstein and Rose [Competition
and Price Dispersion in the US Airline Industry, Journal of Political Economy, 1994, vol. 102, no.
4, pages 664-665].
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cost per seat mile (CSM). The average cost to carry one passenger for one mile is
known in the airline industry as the average cost per seat mile. It is constructed
using the ratio of the quarterly operating expenses over the quarterly total of the
product of the number of seats transported and of the number of miles own by
the airline. We gather data on operating expenses from the Air Carrier Financial
Reports (Form 41 Financial Data) and on the total number of seats and miles own
from the Air Carrier Statistics (Form 41 Tra¢ c). The mean of the average cost
per seat mile is approximately 9 cents per seat mile, and can be as low as 4 cents
and as high as 13 cents. This variable is not market specic. Panel I of Table 10
presents the mean CSM for each bankrupt carrier, across markets and year-quarter
observations, for the periods before, during and after its bankruptcy (measured in
US dollars). There is no evidence of persistent cost declines during or after a carriers
ling. In the case of United Airlines, the average CSM prior to the bankruptcy ling
is 9:4 cents, marginally rising during bankruptcy to 9:8 cents, and continuing to rise
after Uniteds exit from bankruptcy, to 10:6 cents.30 Similar results hold for USAirs
rst ling, where average CSM pre- and during bankruptcy was 12:1 cents, rising
marginally to 12:5 cents post bankruptcy. For ATA, Delta, and Northwest we observe
that the average CSM increases while the rm operates under bankruptcy. ATA and
Northwest marginally lowered average CSM after exiting bankruptcy relative to the
in-bankruptcy CSM, yet Delta continues to increase its CSM. It is only in the case
of USAirs second ling that we observe a decline in average CSM: pre-bankruptcy
this was 12:5 cents, dropping to 11:4 during bankruptcy, and continued to fall after
USAir exited court protection. The unusual cost pattern observed to USAirs second
ling can be explained by the carriers exit strategy: USAir emerged after merging
with low cost carrier America West.31
30Another way to look at this issue is to consider the numerator and denominator of the CSM
separately. The numerator is given by the total operating costs. In the case of United, for example,
the total operating costs were, on average, equal to $1,259,990,000 before the bankruptcy lings,
and equal to $1,660,385,000 after the exit from bankruptcy. So the total operating costs increased
by 30%. As for the denominator, the number of seat-miles before ling for bankruptcy protection
was equal to 1.39e+10 seat-miles and equal to 1.58e+10 after the exit from bankruptcy. So the
denominator increased by 13%. Overall the CSM for United increased.
31 In Figures that are available from the authors, we report a time series of CSM for United Airlines
and USAir for the period pre-, during, and post- bankruptcy. Consistent with the above ndings, we
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Following our discussion above, for each of the bankrupt carriers, we compute the
lowest ticket fare across markets and year-quarters and summarize it in Panel II of
Table 10. As with the evidence for average CSM, we do not nd signicant changes
in the economic opportunity costs during or after the bankruptcy ling. Except for
United Airlinesbankruptcy, all other bankrupt carriers temporarily lower economic
costs during bankruptcy, only to increase it again once it emerges from bankruptcy.
The pre-bankruptcy economic cost for USAirs rst ling was 54:14 dollars, falling to
51:22 dollars during bankruptcy, and rising to 55:33 dollars after the carrier exited
bankruptcy protection. For Delta, pre-bankruptcy economic cost was 50:44 dollars,
barely falling to 49:80 dollars during bankruptcy, only to rise above its pre-bankruptcy
cost to 54:09 dollars after exiting bankruptcy. In the cases of ATA and USAir second
ling, the post-bankruptcy economic cost is above the in-bankruptcy cost, but still
slightly below the pre-bankruptcy one; for instance, ATAs pre-bankruptcy cost was
68:51 dollars, falling to 49:67 dollars during bankruptcy, and rising to 51:64 post-
bankruptcy (relative to the in-bankruptcy cost). These results on economic costs, pre-
, during, and post- bankruptcy, do not support the hypothesis that rms operating
under Chapter 11 signicantly and permanently lower operating cost.
8 Conclusions
Our paper empirically examines whether a rms bankruptcy ling a¤ects product
market competition, using evidence from the US airline industry. We nd that bank-
ruptcy lings lead to a reduction of capacity and prices in the industry. Together
with the fact that we do not nd any evidence of changes in the marginal cost of
transporting a passenger, our results suggest that bankruptcy lings are e¤ective at
reducing xed costs but not marginal costs.
To our knowledge, there is no simple theoretical connection between bankruptcy
lings and market competition. Nonetheless, our results are consistent with the
do not observe any signicant cost decline during or following the rms bankruptcy ling. Evidence
from the average CSM does not support the hypothesis that rms ling for bankruptcy protection
can signicantly reduce costs and thereby impact product market competition.
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idea, often repeated in the mass media, that bankruptcy lings are the result of
wars of attrition over capacity and network cutbacks. Since capacity cutbacks are a
public good that must be provided privately, each rm waits for its competitors to
cut capacity rst.32 Unless the industry outlook improves, the rm generating the
lowest cash ows and with the weakest nancial position becomes unable to meet its
debt obligations, ultimately having to seek bankruptcy protection. Firms engage in
such a war of attrition when Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is an option,
since this law protects the insolvent rm from liquidation by creditors, and allows the
rm to void contracts and reorganize its business strategy, e¤ectively granting the
rm a second chance at life. Operating under Chapter 11, the insolvent rm reduces
capacity and downsizes its network, which can lead to higher product-market prices.
This is the channel through which we link bankruptcy lings to product market price,
capacity, and network e¤ects.
Our analysis is restrictive in a number of aspects and suggests numerous exten-
sions, which constitute themes for future research. First, our paper focuses on the
e¤ect of bankruptcy lings on product market competition, but it would be equally
interesting to investigate the determinants of bankruptcy lings. That new research
might look in more detail into the role of the entry and expansion of low cost carriers.
On the one hand, it is doubtful that it was the advent of low cost carriers per se that
led to bankruptcy lings since bankruptcies were pervasive at the beginning of the
1990s, before the surge in the number of LCCs. On the other hand, the expansion
of low cost carriers in the contemporary US airline industry might have accelerated
the number and frequency of bankruptcy lings as well as their duration.
Second, another important feature of a bankruptcy ling is the shift of control
from equity to debt holders. We do not incorporate such a change in our paper,
as we assume that the objective of the rm is to maximize prots, regardless of
the ownership structure. Future research might look into the bargaining between
di¤erent agents. Eraslan (2007) and Eraslan and Yilmaz (2007) have made important
contributions on this while looking at personal bankruptcies.
32See Ghemawat and Nalebu¤ [1990].
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Finally, our paper uncovers stylized empirical patterns and suggests a unifying
explanation. An interesting and challenging line of research would be to estimate
a structural dynamic model of competition that incorporates the possibility of wars
of attritions among airline rms along with the possibility to le for bankruptcy
protection. An important contribution in this direction has been made by Takahashi
[2010], who estimates the impact of competition and exogenous demand decline on
the exit process of movie theaters in the US from 1950-1965. Takahashi shows that
theaters that are making negative prots may choose to remain in the market if they
expect to outlast their competitors, because at that point their prots would increase.
Takahashi shows that this creates a signicant delay in the exit process.
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 Table 1: Stylized facts 
Bankruptcies in the Airline Industry between 1992 and 2007. Airline Bankruptcies are identified from the Air and Transportation Association (ATA), and cross checked with the 
Bankruptcy Research Database from Professor Lynn LoPucki. The remaining information is obtained from news searches in Lexis-Nexus and Factiva. 
Code  Airline Name File 11 File 7 Voluntary Filing Nu. Date Filed Date Emerged Convert  
11 to 7  
Convert 
11 to 7  
Grounded Days 
WV Air South, Inc. 1 0 1 1 8/28/1997 0 1 9/16/1997 8/28/1997 18 
AQ Aloha Airlines, Inc. 1 0 1 1 12/30/2004 2/17/2006 0 0 0 414 
HP America West Airlines, Inc. 1 0 1 1 6/27/1991 8/25/1994 0 0 0 1138 
TZ Ata Airlines d/b/a Ata. 1 0 1 1 10/26/2004 2/28/2006 0 0 0 490 
HQ Business Express 1 0 0 1 1/22/1996 4/17/1997 0 0 0 445 
CO Continental Air Lines, Inc. 1 0 1 2 12/3/1990 4/27/1993 0 0 0 864 
DL Delta Airlines 1 0 1 1 9/14/2005 4/25/2007 0 0 0 563 
W9 Eastwind Airlines, Inc. 0 1 0 1 9/30/1999 0 0 0 9/8/1999  
QD Grand Airways, Inc. 1 0 1 2 11/28/1995 0 1 1/4/1996 1/4/1996 36 
HA Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. 1 0 1 1 9/21/1993 9/12/1994 0 0 0 351 
HA Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. 1 0 1 2 3/21/2003 6/2/2005 0 0 0 791 
FLYi Independence Air 1 0 1 1 11/7/2005 1/5/2006 0 0 0 59 
KP Kiwi International 1 0 1 1 9/30/1996 0 1 7/17/1997 10/15/1996 287 
KP Kiwi International 1 0 1 2 3/23/1999 0 1 8/27/1999 3/24/1999 154 
BF Markair, Inc. 1 0 1 1 6/8/1992 5/4/1994 0 0 0 686 
BF Markair, Inc. 1 0 1 2 4/14/1995 0 1 12/4/1995 10/25/1995 230 
JI Midway Airlines, Inc. 1 0 1 2 8/14/2001 0 1 10/30/2003 9/11/2001 796 
N7 National Airlines 1 0 1 1 12/6/2000 0 1 11/6/2002 11/6/2002 690 
NW Northwest Airlines 1 0 1 1 9/14/2005 5/18/2007 0 0 0 611 
PN Pan American Airways Corp. 1 0 1 2 2/26/1998 6/28/1998 0 0 2/26/1998 122 
P9 Pro Air, Inc. 1 0 1 1 9/19/2000 0 1 10/5/2001 9/19/2000 376 
SY Sun Country Airlines 0 1 0 1 1/8/2002 4/15/2002 7 to 11: 
3/13/2002 
4/15/2002 12/7/2001 97 
FF Tower Air, Inc. 1 0 1 1 2/29/2000 0 1 12/7/2000 5/1/2000 282 
TW Trans World Airways, Llc 1 0 1 1 1/30/1992 11/3/1993 0 0 0 633 
TW Trans World Airways, Llc 1 0 1 2 6/30/1995 8/24/1995 0 0 0 54 
TW Trans World Airways, Llc 1 0 1 3 1/10/2001 0 0 4/9/2001 0 89 
UA United Airlines 1 0 1 1 12/9/2002 2/2/2006 0 0 0 1513 
US USAir 1 0 1 1 8/11/2002 3/31/2003 0 0 0 230 
US USAir 1 0 1 2 9/12/2004 9/27/2005 0 0 0 375 
NJ Vanguard Airlines, Inc. 1 0 1 1 7/30/2002 0 1 12/19/2003 7/30/2002 499 
W7 Western Pacific Airlines 1 0 1 1 10/5/1997 0 1 2/4/1998 2/4/1998 119 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for the Market Competition Variables
 Full Sample Subsample with 
 a Bankrupt Firm 
Subsample without a 
Bankrupt Firm 
Subsample with a Firm that 
was previously bankrupt 
Observations 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean SD Mean S.D.  
National-Carrier Route Structure 
(count of origin-destination airport pairs) 
373 201.22 376.42 234.89 376.25 200.22 328.03 161.09 443 
Airport-Carrier  Route Structure 
(number of routes served out of airport) 
18.89 13.03 19.12 13.63 18.79 12.91 19.99 13.75 26,115 
Route-Carrier  Flight Frequency 
(number of departures in a route) 
362.29 379.01 348.10 267.05 365.71 391.01 318.50 257.38 194,709 
Route-Carrier  Number of Seats 
(number of seats transported) 
45846.46 43310.19 44451.93 42729.6 46170.05 43540.18 41753.89 39444.12 194,709 
Route-Carrier  Load Factor 
(passengers over seats) 
0.671 0.142 0.741 0.125 0.662 0.142 0.753 0.124 194,709 
Market-Carrier  Median Fare ($1993) 126.19 39.41 118.919 34.114 126.878 40.175 126.82 34.74 493,436 
United Airlines is under Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy Protection (0/1) 
0.14 0.35        
USAir is under Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
Protection, First Filing (0/1) 
0.02 0.14        
USAir is under Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
Protection, Second Filing (0/1) 
0.03 0.16        
Delta Airlines is under Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy Protection (0/1) 
0.10 0.30        
Northwest Airlines is under Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy Protection  (0/1) 
0.07 0.25        
ATA is under Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
Protection  (0/1) 
0.01 0.10        
National Airlines is under Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy Protection (0/1) 
0.00 0.05        
 
 
Table 3: The Parameters Measuring the Effect of Bankruptcy Filings 
 
Time UA is Bankrupt UA is in Market Effect on UA Effect on AA 
-1 0 1 0 0 
0 1 1 αOWN αOTHER 
1 1 1 αOWN αOTHER 
2 1 0 0 0 
3 0 1 βOWN βOTHER 
4 0 0 0 0 
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Table 4: The Impact of Chapter 11 Filings on National-Carrier Route Structure 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the total number of airport-airport combinations served by carrier j during year-quarter t. 
      
αOWN, In-Bankruptcy Effect on  -0.595*** -0.530*** -0.307*** -0.154 -0.548*** 
Bankrupt Firm’s National Route Structure (0.095) 
[-0.448] 
(0.079) 
[-0.411] 
(0.068) 
[-0.264] 
(0.128) 
[-0.143] 
(0.081) 
[-0.422] 
αOTHER, Post-Bankruptcy Effect on  -1.063*** -1.013*** -0.647*** -0.336** -1.035*** 
Bankrupt Firm’s National Route Structure (0.109) 
[-0.654] 
(0.103) 
[-0.637] 
(0.083) 
[-0.476] 
(0.149) 
[-0.285] 
(0.104) 
[-0.645] 
βOWN, In-Bankruptcy Effect on the  0.122 0.147 0.115*** 0.008 0.150 
National Route Structure of the Rivals (0.213) 
[0.130] 
(0.173) 
[0.158] 
(0.038) 
[0.122] 
(0.079) 
[0.008] 
(0.173) 
[0.161] 
βOTHER, In-Bankruptcy Effect on the  -0.074 -0.099 0.376*** 0.217** -0.112 
National Route Structure of the Rivals (0.196) 
[-0.071] 
(0.170) 
[-0.094] 
(0.043) 
[0.456] 
(0.085) 
[0.242] 
(0.176) 
[-0.106] 
One Period Lag In-Bankruptcy Effect on 
Bankrupt Firm’s National Route Structure 
    -0.016 
(0.269) 
One Period Lag In-Bankruptcy Effect on 
Bankrupt Firm’s National Route Structure 
    0.005 
(0.452) 
Two Periods Lag In-Bankruptcy Effect on 
Bankrupt Firm’s National Route Structure 
    -0.041 
(0.198) 
Two Periods Lag In-Bankruptcy Effect on 
Bankrupt Firm’s National Route Structure 
    0.239 
(0.327) 
Observations 363 443 443 443 443 
Carrier Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Year-Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes 
2 Prior Quarters Excluded Yes No No No No 
Within R2 0.824 0.824 0.787 0.038 0.826 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
Table 5: The Impact of Chapter 11 Filings on Airport-Carrier  Route Structure 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the total number of markets served out of airport a, by carrier j in the year-quarter t.  
      
αOWN, In-Bankruptcy Effect on -0.302*** -0.291*** -0.286*** -0.176*** -0.308*** 
Bankrupt Firm’s Route Structure (0.037) 
[-0.261] 
(0.034) 
[-0.252] 
(0.034) 
[-0.249] 
(0.031) 
[-0.161] 
(0.035) 
[-0.265] 
αOTHER, Post-Bankruptcy Effect on -0.270*** -0.283*** -0.278*** -0.213*** -0.286*** 
Bankrupt Firm’s Route Structure (0.065) 
[-0.237] 
(0.061) 
[-0.246] 
(0.061) 
[-0.243] 
(0.052) 
[-0.192] 
(0.062) 
[-0.249] 
βOWN, In-Bankruptcy Effect on the -0.136*** -0.127*** -0.108*** 0.095*** -0.127*** 
Route Structure of the Rivals (0.027) 
[-0.127] 
(0.022) 
[-0.119] 
(0.022) 
[-0.102] 
(0.014) 
[0.099] 
(0.022) 
[-0.119] 
βOTHER, In-Bankruptcy Effect on the 0.080** 0.076*** 0.083*** 0.109*** 0.071*** 
Route Structure of the Rivals (0.037) 
[0.083] 
(0.030) 
[0.079] 
(0.037) 
[0.086] 
(0.015) 
[0.115] 
(0.031) 
[0.073] 
One Period Lag In-Bankruptcy Effect on 
Bankrupt Firm’s Route Structure 
    -0.202 
(0.193) 
One Period Lag In-Bankruptcy Effect on 
the Route Structure of the Rivals 
    0.051 
(0.027) 
Two Periods Lag In-Bankruptcy Effect on 
Bankrupt Firm’s Airport  Route Structure 
    -0.212*** 
(0.026) 
Two Periods Lag In-Bankruptcy Effect on 
Bankrupt Firm’s Route Structure 
    -0.028 
(0.020) 
Observations 22,318 26,115 26,115 26,115 33,788 
Number of Route-Carrier Groups 716 718 718 718 1,173 
Airport-Carrier Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2 Prior Quarters Excluded Yes No No No No 
Origin Time trends Yes Yes No No Yes 
Year-Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Within R2 0.148 0.141 0.091 0.028 0.144 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered by Airport. 
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Table 6: The Impact of Chapter 11 Filings on Route-Carrier Flight Frequency  
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of departures performed in route r, on year-quarter t, by carrier j.  
       
αOWN, In-Bankruptcy Effect on -0.242*** -0.243*** -0.247*** -0.147*** -0.241*** -0.238*** 
Bankrupt Firm’s Frequency (0.0164) 
[-0.215] 
(0.015) 
[-0.216] 
(0.015) 
[-0.219] 
(0.012) 
[-0.137] 
(0.016) 
[-0.214] 
(0.016) 
[-0.212] 
αOTHER, Post-Bankruptcy Effect on -0.397*** -0.398*** -0.404*** -0.265*** -0.392*** -0.396*** 
Bankrupt Firm’s Frequency (0.025) 
[-0.328] 
(0.024) 
[-0.328] 
(0.0241) 
[-0.332] 
(0.020) 
[-0.233] 
(0.025) 
[-0.324] 
(0.025) 
[-0.327] 
βOWN, In-Bankruptcy Effect on the -0.014 -0.013 0.005 0.079*** -0.021 -0.009 
Frequency  of the Rivals (0.015) 
[0.014] 
(0.014) 
[0.013] 
(0.014) 
[0.005] 
(0.014) 
[0.082] 
(0.015) 
[-0.021] 
(0.014) 
[-0.009] 
βOTHER, In-Bankruptcy Effect on the -0.019 -0.026 0.011 0.123 -0.031 -0.025 
Frequency of the Rivals (0.019) 
[-0.019] 
(0.018) 
[-0.026] 
(0.019) 
[0.011] 
(0.017) 
[0.131] 
(0.018) 
[-0.030] 
(0.018) 
[-0.025] 
One Period Lag In-Bankruptcy Effect 
on Bankrupt Firm 
     -0.037*** 
(0.011) 
One Period Lag In-Bankruptcy Effect 
on Rivals 
     0.000 
(0.016) 
Two Periods Lag In-Bankruptcy Effect 
on Bankrupt Firm 
     0.051 
(0.012) 
Two Periods Lag In-Bankruptcy Effect 
on Bankrupt Firm 
     0.028* 
(0.015) 
Observations 188,610 194,709 194,709 194,709 188,610 194,709 
Number of Route-Carrier Groups 7,328 7,344 7,344 7,344 7,328 7,344 
Route-Carrier Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
2 Prior Quarters Excluded Yes No No No Yes No 
Origin & Destination Time Trends Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Within R2 0.074 0.074 0.029 0.013 0.073 0.074 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered by route. 
 
 
Table 7: The Impact of Chapter 11 Filings on Route-Carrier  Number of Seats  (Capacity ) 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the total number of seats transported in route r, on year-quarter t, by carrier j.  
       
αOWN, In-Bankruptcy Effect on Bankrupt Firm’s 
Route-Carrier  Capacity  
-0.351*** 
(0.019) 
[-0.296] 
-0.340*** 
(0.018) 
[-0.288] 
-0.344*** 
(0.018) 
[-0.291] 
-0.315*** 
(0.017) 
[-0.270] 
-0.350*** 
(0.019) 
[-0.295] 
-0.339*** 
(0.019) 
[-0.287] 
αOTHER, Post-Bankruptcy Effect on Bankrupt 
Firm’s Route-Carrier  Capacity 
-0.426*** 
(0.027) 
[-0.347] 
-0.419*** 
(0.026) 
[-0.342] 
-0.377*** 
(0.026) 
[-0.314] 
-0.324*** 
(0.022) 
[-0.277] 
-0.417*** 
(0.027) 
[-0.341] 
-0.418*** 
(0.026) 
[-0.341] 
βOWN, In-Bankruptcy Effect on the Route-Carrier  
Capacity of the Rivals 
-0.036** 
(0.017) 
[-0.035] 
-0.031** 
(0.016) 
[-0.030] 
0.008 
(0.016) 
[0.008] 
0.024 
(0.015) 
[0.024] 
-0.047*** 
(0.016) 
[-0.046] 
-0.029* 
(0.016) 
[-0.028] 
βOTHER, In-Bankruptcy Effect on the Route-
Carrier  Capacity of the Rivals 
-0.059*** 
(0.021) 
[-0.057] 
-0.067*** 
(0.020) 
[-0.065] 
0.020 
(0.023) 
[0.020] 
0.068*** 
(0.020) 
[0.070] 
-0.077** 
(0.021) 
[-0.074] 
-0.067*** 
(0.021) 
[-0.065] 
One Period Lag In-Bankruptcy Effect on the 
Bankrupt Firm’s Route-Carrier  Capacity 
     -0.044*** 
(0.014) 
One Period Lag In-Bankruptcy Effect on the  
Route-Carrier  Capacity of the Rivals 
     -0.002 
(0.017) 
Two Periods Lag In-Bankruptcy Effect on the 
Bankrupt Firm’s Route-Carrier  Capacity 
     0.029** 
(0.014) 
Two Periods Lag In-Bankruptcy Effect on the 
Route-Carrier  Capacity of the Rivals 
     0.015 
(0.017) 
Observations 188,610 194,709 194,709 194,709 188,610 194,709 
Number of Route-Carrier Groups 7,324 7,344 7,344 7,344 7,328 7,344 
Route-Carrier Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
2 Prior Quarters Excluded Yes No No No No No 
Origin & Destination Time Trends Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Year-Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
Within R2 0.095 0.094 0.029 0.023 0.094 0.094 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered by route. 
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Table 8: The Impact of Chapter 11 Filings on Market-Carrier Prices   
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the median fare charged in market m, in year-quarter t, by carrier j.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
αOWN, In-Bankruptcy Effect on the 
Bankrupt Firm’s Market-Carrier  
Prices 
-0.031*** 
(0.003) 
[-0.030] 
-0.030*** 
(0.002) 
[-0.259] 
-0.056*** 
(0.003) 
[-0.054] 
-0.093*** 
(0.002) 
[-0.089] 
-0.031*** 
(0.003) 
[-0.030] 
-0.037*** 
(0.003) 
[-0.036] 
αOTHER, Post-Bankruptcy Effect on 0.044*** 0.045*** -0.010*** -0.032*** -0.041*** 0.042*** 
the Bankrupt Firm’s Market-
Carrier  Prices 
(0.003) 
[0.045] 
(0.003) 
[0.046] 
(0.004) 
[-0.010] 
(0.003) 
[-0.031] 
(0.003) 
[-0.040] 
(0.003) 
[0.043] 
βOWN, In-Bankruptcy Effect on the -0.005* -0.005 -0.015*** -0.057*** -0.003 -0.006** 
Market-Carrier  Prices of the 
Rivals 
(0.002) 
[-0.005] 
(0.002) 
[-0.005] 
(0.002) 
[-0.015] 
(0.002) 
[-0.055] 
(0.002) 
[-0.003] 
(0.002) 
[-0.006] 
βOTHER, In-Bankruptcy Effect on 
the Market-Carrier  Prices of the 
Rivals 
0.008 
(0.003) 
[0.008] 
0.006 
(0.003) 
[0.006] 
-0.011*** 
(0.002) 
[-0.011] 
-0.010*** 
(0.002) 
[-0.010] 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
[0.007] 
0.007*** 
(0.003) 
[0.003] 
One Period Lag In-Bankruptcy 
Effect on the Bankrupt Firm 
     -0.028*** 
(0.003) 
One Period Lag In-Bankruptcy 
Effect on the Rivals 
     -0.012*** 
(0.002) 
Two Periods Lag In-Bankruptcy 
Effect on the Bankrupt Firm 
     -0.023*** 
(0.003) 
Two Periods Lag In-Bankruptcy 
Effect on the Rivals 
     -0.005 
(0.002) 
Three Period Lag In-Bankruptcy 
Effect on the Bankrupt Firm 
     -0.019*** 
(0.003) 
One Period Lag In-Bankruptcy 
Effect on the Rivals 
     -0.001 
(0.002) 
Observations 448,683 493,436 493,436 493,436 448,683 493,436 
Number of Market-Group Groups 21,688 21,844 21,844 21,844 21,688 21,844 
Market-Carrier Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
2 Prior Quarters Excluded Yes No No No No No 
Origin & Destination Time Trends Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Year-Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
Within R2 0.159 0.165 0.125 0.030 0.157 0.166 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered by market. 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: The Impact of Chapter 11 Filings on Route-Carrier Load Factor 
 A carrier's load factor is defined as the ratio of passengers flown to offered seats, by a carrier j, in route r, on year-quarter t. It measures 
the airline's utilization of capacity. For example, a load factor of 1 indicates that the carrier fills the plane fully, selling every available 
seat on the plane. The mean load factor in the full sample is 0.671. 
 Own Effect Effect on Competitors 
 During After During After 
 
At least on carrier in the route is bankrupt -0.011*** -0.0141*** 0.029*** 0.036*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
Observations 188,610 
Number of Route-Carrier Groups 7,328 
Within R2 0.223 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered by route. 
The regression includes  year-quarter fixed effects; origin and destination time trends; route-carrier fixed effects. We drop observations 
corresponding to two quarters prior the filings. 
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Table 10: Accounting and Economic Cost Before, During, and After the Bankruptcy Filing 
Panel I: Accounting Seat per Mile Costs Before, During, and After the Bankruptcy Filing (Means) 
The unit of measure is a dollar. Thus, 0.094 are 9.4 cents per seat per mile. 
 Before Bankruptcy During Bankruptcy After Bankruptcy 
 
United 0.094 
(0.008) 
0.098 
(0.007) 
0.106 
(0.002) 
 
US Airways, First bkt 0.121 
(0.011) 
0.121 
(0.005) 
0.125 
(0.007) 
 
US Airways, Second bkt 0.125 
(0.007) 
0.114 
(0.004) 
0.110 
(0.004) 
 
ATA 0.068 
(0.011) 
0.091 
(0.040) 
0.074 
(0.004) 
 
Delta 0.088 
(0.010) 
0.109 
(0.004) 
0.111 
(0.000) 
 
Northwest 0.095 
(0.010) 
0.116 
(0.009) 
0.110 
(0.002) 
 
Panel II: The Economic Opportunity Cost: Costs Before, During, and After the Bankruptcy Filing 
These are lowest prices for a ticket that a carrier charges in a quarter-year. They are averaged across the markets, year, and quarters.  
 Before Bankruptcy During Bankruptcy After Bankruptcy 
 
United 50.560 
(3.403) 
53.594 
(3.026) 
55.563 
(3.881) 
 
US Airways, First bkt 52.137 
(4.347) 
51.215 
(2.876) 
 
55.331 
(4.020) 
US Airways, Second bkt 53.0146 
(4.379) 
49.667 
(2.743) 
51.643 
(4.334) 
 
ATA 68.507 
(11.358) 
57.523 
(4.623) 
61.393 
(11.039) 
 
Delta 50.436 
(3.945) 
49.796 
(2.885) 
54.086 
(4.087) 
 
Northwest 50.340 
(4.007) 
46.285 
(3.436) 
49.470 
(1.931) 
 
